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Abstract
Anomaly detection is a classical problem where the aim is to detect anomalous data that do not belong
to the normal data distribution. Current state-of-the-art methods for anomaly detection on complex high-
dimensional data are based on the generative adversarial network (GAN). However, the traditional GAN loss
is not directly aligned with the anomaly detection objective: it encourages the distribution of the generated
samples to overlap with the real data and so the resulting discriminator has been found to be ineffective
as an anomaly detector. In this paper, we propose simple modifications to the GAN loss such that the
generated samples lie at the boundary of the real data distribution. With our modified GAN loss, our
anomaly detection method, called Fence GAN (FGAN), directly uses the discriminator score as an anomaly
threshold. Our experimental results using the MNIST, CIFAR10 and KDD99 datasets show that Fence
GAN yields the best anomaly classification accuracy compared to state-of-the-art methods.
1 Introduction
Anomaly detection is a well-known problem in artificial intelligence where one aims to identify anomalous
instances that do not belong to the normal data distribution [5, 14]. It is used in a wide range of applications
such as network intrusion [10], credit card fraud [29], crowd surveillance [20, 23], healthcare [25] and many more.
Traditional classifiers trained in a supervised setting do not work well in anomaly detection since the anomalous
data is usually unavailable or very few. Hence, anomaly detectors are usually trained in an unsupervised setting
where the distribution of the normal data is learned and instances that are unlikely to be under this distribution
are identified as anomalous.
For complex high-dimensional datasets such as images, traditional methods for anomaly detection are unsuitable.
Instead, recent methods based on generative adversarial networks (GANs) have shown state-of-the-art anomaly
detection performance by exploiting GANs ability to model high-dimensional data distributions. However, we
identify a shortcoming of current GAN-based anomaly detection methods: the usual GAN objective encourages
the distribution of generated samples to overlap with the real data, and this is not directly aligned with the
anomaly detection objective. The resulting discriminator has been found to be ineffective in detecting anomalous
data. Hence, in this paper, we propose a simple modification to the GAN objective such that the generated
samples lie at the boundary of real data distribution instead of overlapping it. Our method, which we call
Fence GAN (FGAN), trains in the usual adversarial manner with the modified objective and we show that the
resulting discriminator can be used as an anomaly detector. We conducted experiments on MNIST, CIFAR10
and KDD99 datasets and show that FGAN outperforms state-of-the-art methods at anomaly detection.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose an anomaly detection method using the basic GAN architecture and framework.
• We modify the GAN loss such that the samples are generated only at the boundary of the data distribution
unlike the traditional GANs that generate samples over the whole data distribution.
• The proposed method is tested on MNIST, CIFAR10 and KDD99 datasets, showing improved accuracies
over other state-of-the-art methods.
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2 Related work
Traditional methods for anomaly detection include one-class SVM [26], nearest neighbor [9], clustering [28],
kernel density estimation [21] and hidden markov models [13]. However, such methods are not suitable for high-
dimensional image data. Recent developments in deep learning have led to significant progress in supervised
learning tasks on complex image datasets [15, 24]. For anomaly detection, deep learning based methods include
deep belief networks [8], variational autoencoders [2, 30] and adversarial autoencoders [4, 18, 19, 34].
Among the deep learning methods, generative adversarial networks (GANs) [11, 22] have been the subject
of extensive research as they show state-of-the-art performance in modeling complex high-dimensional image
distributions. Similarly, GANs have been used for anomaly detection. In AnoGAN [25], the authors propose
an anomaly detector where the GAN is first trained on the normal images, and for a test image, the latent
space is iteratively searched to find the latent vector that best reconstructs the test image. The anomaly score
is a combination of the reconstruction loss and the loss between the intermediate discriminator feature of the
test image and the reconstructed image. A similar framework is used in ADGAN [7], where the anomaly score
is based only on reconstruction loss, the search in latent space is repeated with multiple seeds and both the
latent vector and generator are optimized. A more recent method, called Efficient GAN [32], makes use of the
BiGAN model that is able to map from the image to latent space without iterative search, resulting in superior
anomaly detection performance and faster test times. Finally, in the GANomaly framework [1], the generator
consists of encoder-decoder-encoder subnetworks and the anomaly score is based on a combination of encoding,
reconstruction and feature matching losses. GANomaly has shown superior performance compared to AnoGAN
and Efficient GAN on several image datasets such as MNIST and CIFAR10.
Except for GANomaly, the GAN-based anomaly detection methods above train GAN with the usual minimax
loss function where the generator aims to generate samples that overlap with the data distribution. Under the
usual GAN loss function, the discriminator probability score was found to be ineffective [7], and we hypothesize
that this is because the discriminator is not explicitly trained to fence the boundary of the data distribution.
Contrary to these methods, our proposed Fence GAN aims to learn the boundary of the normal data distribution.
We achieve this by modifying the generator’s objective to aim to generate data lying on the boundary of the
normal data distribution, instead of overlapping with the data distribution. At test time, the anomaly score is
simply the discriminator score given to the input data. Our alternative generator objective is similar to the one
in Dai et al. [6], where they show that for the discriminator to be a good classifier, the generator has to produce
complement samples instead of matching with the true data distribution. With the modified GAN loss, Fence
GAN does not need to rely on reconstruction loss from the generator and does not require modifications to the
basic GAN architecture unlike Efficient GAN and GANomaly.
3 Method
3.1 Original GAN loss function
In the original generative adversarial network by Goodfellow et al. [12], for a set X of N number of data points
X = {x1,x2, ...,xN} with xi in a Euclidean data space Rd, d ∈ Z+, i = 1, 2, .., N , which is sampled from a data
distribution pdata : Rd → R+, we seek to map points from a prior noise distribution pnoise : Rk → R+, k ∈ Z+
to pdata. For example, if each data point represents an image, then d would be the number of pixels in the
image. The dimension k is set arbitrarily.
The mapping from pnoise to pdata is done by first using a differentiable function, represented by a “generator”
multilayer perceptron Gθ with θ being its weights and biases, to map pnoise to the generated distribution
pg : Rd → R+ from the output Gθ(z), Gθ(z) ∈ Rd of Gθ and z is drawn from pnoise. In addition, we also have
a “discriminator” multilayer perceptron Dφ with φ being its weights and biases, which outputs a real value
Dφ(x) ∈ [0, 1] that represents the probability of x - a point in Rd being drawn from pdata rather than from
pg. Dφ and Gθ engage in a two-player minimax game, with Dφ and Gθ being alternatingly trained to minimize
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their respective loss functions as follows:
LGANGθ (Gθ, Dφ,Z) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
log(1−Dφ(Gθ(zi)))
]
(1)
LGANDφ (Gθ, Dφ,X ,Z) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
− log(Dφ(xi))− log(1−Dφ(Gθ(zi)))
]
(2)
where Z = {z1, z2, ...,zN} is sampled from pnoise. LGANGθ is the loss function of Gθ and LGANDφ is the loss
function of Dφ.
In this way, Dφ is trained to differentiate whether x is drawn from pdata or from pg. Meanwhile, Gθ is trained
to map pnoise to pg so as to maximise the score of its generated points as given by the discriminator, that is,
Dφ(Gθ(z)).
The training of GAN is completed if the distribution pg is indistinguishable from pdata. When this occurs, pdata
is estimated by pg. Therefore, the mapping of points from pnoise to pg, which is represented by Gθ, is also the
mapping of points from pnoise to pdata.
3.2 Modified loss functions
We propose Fence GAN (FGAN) which has a different objective from the original GAN’s. Whereas the original
GAN aims to generate pg = pdata, that is, to generate points at regions of high data density, our objective is to
generate points around the boundary of X , which we denote as δX . This will enable our discriminator, at the
end of training, to draw a boundary “tightly” around X . Such a discriminator can then be used as a one-class
classifier or an anomaly detector.
Learning δX directly is known to be an extremely difficult problem in high dimensions [27]. Thus, we use
the discriminator score to define the domain of δX and then estimate δX using the generator in FGAN. The
generated points Gθ(z) then must enclose the real data points tightly as shown in Figure 1(A). In order to achieve
our objective, we propose a series of modifications to the loss functions for the generator and discriminator:
encirclement and dispersion losses for generator, and weighted discriminator loss for discriminator.
3.2.1 Generator
Encirclement Loss
In our proposed FGAN, we want the generator to generate points Gθ(z) that lie in δX . We first define points
on δX to be those that yield a discriminator score of α. To reflect this, the objective function of the generator
in FGAN to be minimized is therefore:
EL
(
Gθ, Dφ,Z
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
log(|α−Dφ(Gθ(zi))|)
]
(3)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is used for the generator to generate points on δX . The rationale for Eq. (3) is that points
generated inside of X will have a discriminator score higher than α and hence the generator will be penalised.
On the other hand, points generated far from X will have a discriminator score less than α and hence the
generator is also penalised. Only when points are generated at the α-level set of the discriminator score will
they yield optimal generator loss. This level set should ideally tightly enclose the real data points. In our
experiments, we tune the value for α as a hyperparameter.
Dispersion loss
Based on the encirclement loss alone, however, there is no guarantee that the generated points will cover the
entirety of δX , it may only cover a small part of it, as shown in Figure 1(C). We note that this is similar to
the mode collapse problem in GAN. The dispersion loss, which maximizes distance of the generated data points
from their centre of mass µ, µ ∈ Rd, is thus introduced to encourage the generated points to cover the whole
boundary.
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µ = (µ1, µ2, ..., µd)
µ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Gθ(zi)
The dispersion loss is thus:
DL(Gθ,Z) = 11
N
∑N
i=1(‖Gθ(zi)− µ‖2)
(4)
We use L2 distance because in our experiments we found that it works better compared to L1 and L∞ distances.
The loss function of the generator in FGAN to be minimized is defined as the weighted sum of the encirclement
loss and the dispersion loss:
LFGANgenerator
(
Gθ, Dφ,Z
)
= EL + β × DL
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
log
[
|α−Dφ(Gθ(zi))|
]]
+ β × 1
1
N
∑N
i=1(‖Gθ(zi)− µ‖2)
(5)
where β is the dispersion hyperparameter with β ∈ R+.
3.2.2 Discriminator
Weighted Discriminator Loss
As the generator becomes better in approximating δX , the discriminator faces a trade-off: to classify real data
correctly or classify generated data correctly. If the discriminator focuses more on classifying generated data
correctly, then the discriminator will start to classify real data as generated data. Thus, the loss function of the
discriminator should be modified to prioritise classifying real data correctly:
LFGANdiscriminator
(
Gθ, Dφ,X ,Z
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
− log (Dφ(xi))− γ log(1−Dφ(Gθ(zi)))] (6)
where γ is the anomaly hyperparameter with γ ∈ (0, 1]. When γ is less than 1, the discriminator will focus more
on classifying the real data points correctly, thus its decision boundary is less likely to bend into the domain of
X , allowing the generator to better estimate δX . We empirically tune γ for each dataset.
3.3 Fence GAN (FGAN)
FGAN is composed of a generator and a discriminator being trained one after another like a typical GAN. The
number of steps to train Gθ and Dφ for each iteration are hyperparameters to be tuned. However for simplicity,
we train both networks once in each iteration.
Algorithm 1 Stochastic gradient descent training of FGAN.
for number of training iterations do
• Sample noise samples Z = {z1, z2, ...,zN} from prior pnoise
• Update the generator’s parameters:
θ ← θ − ηg∇θLFGANgenerator
(
Gθ, Dφ,Z
)
• Resample noise samples Z = {z1, z2, ...,zN} from prior pnoise
• Sample data samples X = {x1,x2, ...,xN} from real data distribution pdata
• Update the discriminator’s parameters:
φ← φ− ηd∇φLFGANdiscriminator
(
Gθ, Dφ,Z,X
)
end for
The generator and discriminator learning rates ηg and ηd are to be set.
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4 Experiments
In our experiments, we tested FGAN on a synthetic 2D dataset to study the training process in FGAN. Next,
we tested FGAN for anomaly detection on three datasets: MNIST, CIFAR10 and KDD99, comparing the
performance to state-of-the-art anomaly detection methods.
4.1 2D synthetic dataset
We illustrate the effect of FGAN using a 2D synthetic dataset where the data is sampled from a unimodal
normal distribution, as shown in Figure 1. The red points represent the real data while the blue points are
the generated points. The color of the shaded background represents the discriminator score, where the score
increases from blue to red. We trained 5 different FGAN models with different hyperparameters over 30,000
epochs.
In (A), we show snapshots of training process at 4 epochs for an FGAN trained with optimal hyperparameters,
yielding a good discriminator at the end of the training. The other examples show hyperparameters that
lead to suboptimal performance. (B) shows the result of original GAN [12], where the real data points and
generated data points are indistinguishable and the discriminator decision boundary does not surround the
real data. (C) illustrates an example of generated points coalescing in one small region and the discriminator
classifies most of the data space as positive instances. (D) shows an example of loosely enclosed generated points
where the discriminator decision boundary is away from the real data points. (E) shows another example of
indistinguishable real data and generated data distributions with bad discriminator decision boundaries. This
experiment on the 2D dataset shows that under the optimal hyperparameters, the encirclement loss, dispersion
loss and weighted discriminator loss in FGAN give rise to the desired result of the generated samples forming
a tight boundary around the dataset.
Tightly enclosed
Indistinguishable Coalescence Loosely enclosed Indistinguishable
Figure 1: FGAN on a normal distribution in two dimensions. Red points are data points and blue points are
generated points. The color of the shaded background represents the discriminator score. We trained 5 different
models with different hyperparameters over 3×104 epochs. (A) shows snapshots of training process for a FGAN
trained with optimal hyperparameters, yielding a good discriminator in the end of the training. (B)-(E) are
examples of hyperparameters that lead to suboptimal performance of FGAN.
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4.2 MNIST
To show the effectiveness of our proposed idea, we run FGAN for anomaly detection on the MNIST dataset [17].
In each case, we consider data points from a class as ‘anomalous’ (positive class) and data points from the other
9 classes as ‘normal’ (negative class). We then split the entire MNIST dataset which consists of 70000 images
from 10 classes into 2 sets as follows: Training set consists of 80% of all data points in the ‘normal’ class.
Testing set consists of the rest 20% of data in the ‘normal’ class and all data in the ‘anomalous’ class. We then
evaluate our model as a binary classifier for normal and anomalous data. Our performance is measured by Area
Under Precision and Recall Curve (AUPRC). The architecture as well as hyperparameters to train FGAN are
presented in Table 1.
Operation Kernel Strides Features Maps/Units BN? Activation
Generator
Dense 1024 X ReLU
Dense 7×7×128 X ReLU
Transposed Convolution 4×4 2×2 64 X ReLU
Transposed Convolution 4×4 2×2 1 × Tanh
Latent Dimension 200
Encirclement α 0.1
Dispersion β 30
Optimizer Adam(lr=2e-5, decay=1e-4)
Discriminator
Convolution 4×4 2×2 64 × Leaky ReLU
Convolution 4×4 2×2 64 × Leaky ReLU
Dense 1024 × Leaky ReLU
Dense 1 × Sigmoid
Leaky ReLU slope 0.1
Optimizer Adam(lr=1e-5, decay=1e-4)
Anomaly γ 0.1
Epochs 100
Batchsize 200
Table 1: Architecture and hyperparameters of FGAN on MNIST Dataset
We train FGAN for 100 epochs with a training batch size of 100 and obtain the average AUPRC across 3 different
seeds for each anomalous class. Mean AUPRC in comparison to other benchmark methods are shown in Figure
2. The other benchmark methods are trained using the same setup for splitting of the train and test sets. We
reimplement GANomaly [1] using the hyperparameters used by the authors to obtain the AUPRC while the
results for EGBAD, AnoGAN and VAE were taken from [31]. As seen from the AUPRC figures, FGAN has
the highest accuracy for all but one digit class. Interestingly, for digit classes where the other methods perform
badly (eg. digits 1, 7, 9), FGAN’s detection accuracy remains high. This shows FGAN’s robustness in anomaly
detection for the MNIST dataset.
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Figure 2: Detection accuracies for FGAN and benchmark methods on MNIST dataset.
4.3 CIFAR10
Next, we run the anomaly detection test on the CIFAR10 dataset [16]. Similar to the MNIST experiment, we
consider data points from a class as ‘anomalous’ and data points from the other 9 classes as ‘normal’. We split
the entire CIFAR10 dataset with 60000 images into a training set consisting of 80% of images in the ‘normal’
class and a testing set consisting of the rest 20% of data in the ‘normal’ class and all data in the ‘anomalous’
class. We train FGAN for 150 epochs with a training batch size of 128. The performance is measured by the Area
Under Receiver Operating Characteristics (AUROC) curve, averaged over 3 seeds. The network architecture
and hyperparameters to train FGAN are presented in Table 2.
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Operation Kernel Strides Feature Maps / Units BN? Activation
Generator
Dense 2×2×256 X Leaky ReLU
Transposed Convolution 5×5 2×2 128 X Leaky ReLU
Transposed Convolution 5×5 2×2 64 X Leaky ReLU
Transposed Convolution 5×5 2×2 32 X Leaky ReLU
Transposed Convolution 5×5 2×2 3 × Tanh
Latent Dimension 256
Leaky ReLU Slope 0.2
Encirclement α 0.5
Dispersion β 10
Optimizer Adam(lr=1e-3, beta 1 = 0.5, beta 2 = 0.999, decay=1e-5)
Discriminator
Convolution 5×5 2×2 32 X Leaky ReLU
Convolution 5×5 2×2 64 X Leaky ReLU
Convolution 5×5 2×2 128 X Leaky ReLU
Convolution 5×5 2×2 256 × Leaky ReLU
Dropout 0.2 ×
Dense 1 × Sigmoid
Leaky ReLU Slope 0.2
Weight Decay 0.5
Optimizer Adam(lr=1e-4, beta 1 = 0.5, beta 2 = 0.999, decay=1e-5)
Anomaly γ 0.5
Epochs 150
Batch Size 128
Table 2: Architecture and hyperparameters of FGAN on CIFAR-10 Dataset
The anomaly detection results are shown in Figure 3. For all but one anomaly class, FGAN’s accuracy is the
highest among all methods, with AUROC of at least 60% across all classes. For the challenging ‘bird’ class
where the state-of-the-art GANomaly method has an AUROC of just above 50%, FGAN manages an AUROC
of 60%, showing its detection robustness.
In Figure 4, we analyze the distribution of discriminator scores for the normal test images, anomalous images
and generated images where the anomalous class is ‘ship’. The normal test images scores are skewed towards
the high score of 1.0 which is expected from the FGAN loss function. The anomalous images scores show a
bimodal distribution with modes at 0.3 and 1.0, which means some anomalous images are challenging to detect.
This explains the relatively good anomaly detection results in Figure 3. The distribution of scores for generated
images is spread across the entire range which means the generated samples do not converge at a score of
α = 0.5, although this has not significantly impacted anomaly detection performance.
Table 3 shows the average discriminator score for the anomalous ‘ship’ class, the other 9 classes and the
generated images. All scores are taken from the test set. Interestingly the ‘airplane’ class has a lower score than
the anomalous ‘ship’ class, and this may indicate that these two classes are semantically similar and challenging
to differentiate compared to other classes. In Figure 5, we show examples of the generated images with their
corresponding discriminator scores. The generated images are relatively realistic, resembling natural images,
though there is no identifiable pattern from the discriminator scores.
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Figure 3: Detection accuracies for FGAN and benchmark methods on the CIFAR10 dataset.
(a) Normal test images (b) Anomalous images (c) Generated images
Figure 4: CIFAR10 anomalous class: ship. Histogram of discriminator scores for (a) normal test images,
(b) anomalous images and (c) generated images. The normal test images have a distribution that is skewed
towards higher scores, which is expected from the FGAN loss function. The distributions for the anomalous
and generated images are bimodal.
Class Airplane Ship
Generated
images
Dog Bird Cat Car Truck Deer Horse Frog
Average
score
0.505 0.521 0.543 0.669 0.671 0.686 0.717 0.737 0.75 0.752 0.795
Table 3: CIFAR10 anomalous class: ship. Average discriminator scores for the anomalous ‘ship’ class, the other
9 classes and the generated images. All scores were taken from the test set and the average scores are shown in
increasing order.
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Figure 5: CIFAR10 anomalous class: ship. Examples of generated images shown in increasing order of the
discriminator score.
4.4 KDD99
In order to further validate the merits of our approach, we test FGAN on the KDDCUP99 10 percent dataset [3].
We follow the experimental setup of [35] [31] in our experiments. In the KDD99 dataset, data is stratified into
the ‘non-attack’ class and other classes with various attacks. We lump all the other classes with various attacks
as one class and call it the ‘attack’ class. We then train FGAN on the ‘attack’ class only because the proportion
of data belonging to the ‘attack’ class is much larger than the proportion of data belonging to the ‘non-attack’
class. The objective is to detect the ‘non-attack’ instances.
We split the KDD99 dataset as follows: Training set consists of 50% of all data points in the ‘attack’ class.
Testing set consists of the remaining 50% of data in the ‘attack’ class and 50% of data in the ‘non-attack’ class.
We then evaluate our approach against Efficient-GAN. The architecture and hyperparameters to train FGAN
for KDD99 dataset is shown in Table 4.
Operation Units Non Linearity Dropout L2 Regularization
Generator 0 0
Dense 64 ReLU 0.2 0
Dense 128 ReLU 0.2 0
Dense (output) 121 Linear 0 0
Latent Dimension 32
Encirclement α 0.5
Dispersion β 30
Optimizer Adam(lr = 1e-4, decay = 1e-3)
Discriminator 0
Dense 256 Leaky ReLU 0 0
Dense 128 Leaky ReLU 0 0
Dense 128 Leaky ReLU 0 0
Dense (output) 1 Sigmoid 0
Leaky ReLU Slope 0.1
Optimizer SGD(lr = 8e-6, decay = 1e-3)
Anomaly γ 0.5
Table 4: Architecture and hyperparameters for FGAN on KDD99 Dataset.
We train with a batch size of 256 for both discriminator and generator for 50 epochs. The precision, recall and
F1 scores are averaged over 10 different consecutive seeds, as shown in Table 5. FGAN has the best anomaly
detection accuracies compared to the other benchmark methods.
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Model Precision Recall F1
OC-SVM 0.7457 0.8523 0.7954
DSEBM-r 0.8521 0.6472 0.7328
DSEBM-e 0.8619 0.6446 0.7399
DAGMM-NVI 0.9290 0.9447 0.9368
DAGMM 0.9297 0.9442 0.9369
AnoGANfm 0.88± 3× 10−2 0.83± 3× 10−2 0.89± 3× 10−2
AnoGANsigmoid 0.8± 0.1 0.8± 0.1 0.8± 0.1
Efficient-GANfm 0.9± 0.1 0.95± 2× 10−2 0.91± 7× 10−2
Efficient-GANsigmoid 0.92± 7× 10−2 0.96± 1× 10−2 0.94± 4× 10−2
FGAN 0.954±9× 10−3 0.969±9× 10−3 0.95±2× 10−2
Table 5: Performance on the KDD99 dataset. Values for OC-SVM, DSEBM, DAGMM were obtained from
[33], [35]. Values for AnoGAN and Efficient-GAN were obtained from [31]. Precision, Recall, and F1 Score are
calculated with ‘non-attack’ class being the positive class and ‘attack’ class being the negative class.
5 Discussion
State-of-the-art anomaly detection methods for complex high-dimensional data are based on generative adver-
sarial networks. However, in this paper, we identify that the usual GAN loss objective is not directly aligned
with the anomaly detection objective: the loss encourages the distribution of generated samples to overlap with
real data. Hence, the resulting discriminator has been found to be ineffective for anomaly detector. Hence, we
propose simple modifications to the GAN loss such that the generated samples lie at the boundary of real data
distribution. Our method, called Fence GAN, uses the discriminator score as anomaly score. With the modified
GAN loss, Fence GAN does not need to rely on reconstruction loss from the generator and does not require
modifications to the basic GAN architecture unlike Efficient GAN and GANomaly.
On the MNIST, CIFAR10 and KDD99 datasets, Fence GAN outperforms existing methods in anomaly detection.
We have shown that with simple modifications to the GAN loss, the basic GAN architecture and training scheme
can produce an effective anomaly detector for complex high-dimensional data.
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